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CONNECTICUT
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 39 CONNtemplations SPRING 2007
Essay
"Evaluate Me!": Conflicted Thoughts on Gatekeeping
in Legal Scholarship's New Age
PAUL HORWITZ
"Look at me! Grade me! Evaluate and rank me! I'm good, good,
good and oh so smart!"
- Lisa Simpson'
As another entrant into the fast-growing ranks of online law review
supplements, the Connecticut Law Review has chosen to begin by
contemplating-or is that "CONNtemplating?"-an ambiguous phrase:
"Law Reviews Matter: Legal Scholarship, Law Reviews, and the Online
Age." We might read that open-ended phrase in several ways. Perhaps
most interestingly, it might be read as inviting us to think about the
"matter"-the pronouncements, extrusions, eruptions, and, alas,
ephemera-contained within the law review format, and its increasing
emigration to an infinite online space, on SSRN, Bepress, blogs, and
elsewhere. We might also read it as a positive pronouncement: no matter
how battered by their many critics or by competition from online sources,
law reviews do matter, damn it. But the very act of making that
* Visiting Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School; Associate Professor, University of
Alabama School of Law (fall 2007). Co-blogger on Prawfsblawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com.
Thanks to Matt Bodie, Peg Brinig, Al Brophy, Rick Garnett, Ethan Leib, Michael Olivas, and
especially Kelly Horwitz for comments on a draft of this paper.
The Simpsons: The PTA Disbands! (Fox television broadcast April 16, 1995); see Wikiquote,
The Simpsons, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/The Simpsons (follow "6.20 The PTA Disbands"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
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pronouncement, the very need to make the assertion, cannot help but lead
readers to supply the question mark the editors have seen fit to omit. In an
"online age" in which "legal scholarship," in its many forms, can be
propagated with ease and without the assistance of the law review and its
editors, do "Law Reviews Matter?"
In this contribution, I want to offer some decidedly personal thoughts
on the implied question of whether law reviews continue to matter in the
online age, as well as the implied assertion that they do. To make a long
story short, I think they still do matter, with or without online
supplements-and that the existence of online supplements, while surely a
positive development, won't much affect the reasons why they matter.
But, for the most part, that is not the game I will be hunting here.
This question has been the subject of much recent discussion in a
variety of similar online and print publications. If I have anything to
contribute to what has already been said, it is a note or two of a kind that is
often obscured by the professional and professorial voice that still
generally characterizes legal scholarship: some candor, some
tentativeness-and more than a dash of complicity. Michael Olivas
recently observed that although law professors, like most academics, are
deeply fascinated with the "tribal rituals" involved in "who gets what and
how they go about getting it," these issues are still "a little embarrassing
and uncomfortable to mention in public." What I have to offer here are
some embarrassing and uncomfortable thoughts on who gets what and how
they go about getting it in the online age.
A useful place to start, I think, is to situate this commentary within and
between a set of antinomies posed by other scholars, both of which serve
as the leitmotifs of this short contribution. The first is a paired opposition
presented by Julius Getman, in his deeply personal and valuable critique of
the present state of the American university, and especially the law school,
In the Company of Scholars.4  Getman writes of his discovery over time
that "the surface calm of academic life obscure[s] a continual struggle
between the elitist and egalitarian aspects of higher education."' As Peter
Alces summarizes the theme, "the members of the academy are
preoccupied both with their prestigious titles and trappings and, at the same
2 See, e.g., Symposium, Open Access Publishing and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 10 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 733 (2006); Editorial, The Future of Legal Scholarship, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 1 (2006), http://Aalelawjournal.org/editorial/the-future-of-legal-scholarship.htnl; Symposium,
Bloggership: How, Blogs Are Transforming Legal Scholarship, Berkman Center for Internet & Society,
Harvard Law School, http:/',cyber.1aw" .harvard.edu,/home/blo'-ership (last visited Apr.28, 2007).
Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Academic Merit Badges and Becoming an Eagle Scout, 43
HOUS. L. REv. 81, 82, 85 (2006); see also David P. Bryden, Scholarship About Scholarship, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 641, 642 (1992) ("Our reticence on the subject of professorial selfishness reflects, I
suppose, a taboo against cynicism within the family.").
4 JULIUS GETMAN, IN THE COMPANY OF SCHOLARS: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (1992).
5 Id. at 2.
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time, with disseminating their message and its benefits to all in earshot,
literally or figuratively."6 Those words were published in 1994, but could
not be more applicable to the online age.
Getman does not attempt to resolve the tension, although the book is
surely a cry to other academics to recognize and ameliorate it where they
can. Indeed, although he spiritedly defends egalitarianism in the academy,
he also notes that he came to be "more tolerant of academic elitism and
less comfortable with its populist critics."' Nevertheless, his conclusion is
that the tension between elitism and egalitarianism in the academy is
ubiquitous and endless, a product of the conflicting desires and the
"widespread insecurity" of the scholar and teacher.8
Getman's depiction of the eternal conflict between elitist and
egalitarian values in the academy helps frame our understanding of
changes in the legal academy that have been occurring since long before
the online age, let alone the rise of blogs and online law review
supplements, but which surely have been reinforced by those
developments. A fairly standard account might run something like this: In
the old days, elites ruled. A relatively small number of professors at a
relatively small number of highly prestigious law schools stood at the top
of a fairly well defined hierarchy-and belonged there (or believed they
did). Their status in the hierarchy was confirmed through the recognition
of their scholarship in a small and select number of prestigious venues: law
reviews at highly ranked schools, university presses, and the like.
Publication in a particularly prestigious journal, as Larry Solum notes,
performed a "certification" function: "if it's in the Yale Law Journal, it
must be good."9 In some cases, certification of a scholar by one of these
intermediaries secured his position as a member of the elite;10 he "wrote
up." In other cases, a professor's membership in an elite school, by dint of
other hard-won credentials, increased the likelihood that he would be
published in an elite law review, which in turn was taken to confirm his
membership in the elite, in an endless circular motion.
6 Peter A. Alces, Toil of the Firestarters, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1707, 1709-10 (1994) (reviewing
GETMAN, supra note 4).
7 GETMAN, supra note 4, at x.
Id. A recent book review seems to have come up with le mot juste here, albeit in a very
different context. See Lee Siegel, The Niceness Racket, NEW REPUBLIc, April 23, 2007, at 49, 50,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWRPB File (reviewing DAVE EGGERS, WHAT IS THE WHAT:
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF VALENTINO ACHEK DENG (2006), and referring to "the exclusive egalitarian
club" of the McSweeney 's publishing enterprise).
' Lawrence B. Solum, Download It While It's Hot: Open Access and Legal Scholarship, 10
LEWIS & CLARKL. REV. 841, 861 (2006).
' Cf Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2002) (judgments
about legal scholarship "determine who is appointed, promoted, published, and featured in important
academic events").
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None of this worked perfectly well, and few would have supposed
otherwise.'' Still, on the whole, the distinction between a few great
schools (and their professors, and their students) and the remaining schools
was clear, and things sorted themselves out more or less as they should.
And this sense of hierarchy was evident throughout the legal profession as
a whole: those students certified as members of the elite through admission
to a prestigious law school, and who in turn spent their time as law review
editors certifying the prestige of their professors, would occupy the
empyrean heights of the great law firms in New York, Boston, or a few
other cities, which would set the standard of greatness for the profession.
Of course there were other options: other schools, other firms, other places.
But those alternatives could, for a long time, be treated as falling beneath
the notice of those who occupied the elite institutions.
The online age, in the conventional account, takes a sledgehammer to
the old days.' 2  As Solum says, "[t]he new world of legal scholarship is
about disintermediation"13  the elimination of all the old barriers and
intermediaries that kept the elites in their place and everyone else in theirs.
Jack Balkin makes a similar point in somewhat different terms, arguing
that the Internet provides a way of "rout[ing] around the traditional
gatekeepers of legal scholarship."
The list of online vehicles for routing around the traditional
gatekeepers is pretty well recognized by now. Legal blogs, of course, are
one way to get noticed through non-traditional channels. Similarly, the
Internet greatly facilitates access to legal scholarship by a wide variety of
readers, and offers legal scholars a means of distributing and publicizing
their work, without the significant mediation supposedly performed by the
law journals.15 Online supplements to mainstream law reviews, like this
" Among other things, as I make clear below with reference to the legal profession as a whole,
some or many of those who sat atop the law school hierarchy did so in part because they managed to
fend off potential competition from women and members of racial and ethnic minorities, who either
were not given a chance to develop the relevant credentials for law teaching or were not given full
consideration as candidates even if they had those credentials. See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, The
Education ofLatino Lawyers: An Essay On Crop Cultivation, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 117, 133-
34(1994).
1 In fact, of course, in many respects things had changed in the legal academy, and the legal
profession as a whole, long before the Internet was even a gleam in Al Gore's eye. But the online age
certainly has contributed to these changes, and added some new wrinkles of its own.
1 Solum, supra note 9, at 857.
14 Jack M. Balkin, Online Legal Scholarship: The Mediun and the Message, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 23, 25 (2006), http: /thepocketpart.org/2006/09/06/balkin.html. Balkin is referring
specifically here to only one gatekeeper-the traditional law review. I think his point can be
generalized, however. Online speech is, in fact, a way of routing around all the traditional elite
gatekeepers: not just the law reviews, and specifically the elite law reviews, but also the elite law
schools that house them, and the elite law professors who train the editors of the top journals and enjoy
pride of place in their pages.
1 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 9, at 858. One of the primary vehicles for disseminating legal
scholarship on the Internet is, of course, the Social Science Research Network, or "SSRN,"
http://www.ssrn.com/.
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one, occupy a middle ground. By selecting pieces from contributors, they
provide a mediating function. But they also provide an additional means
of calling attention to a scholar and his or her work, and may even prove
more willing to publish the work of young and unproved scholars than are
their hard-copy parents.16 The true innovation of the law review
supplements is their form,17 but they thus also serve a routing-around
function. Finally, although they have been around so long that they may
seem unremarkable or dated, Westlaw and Lexis/Nexis themselves also
route around traditional gatekeepers, since they provide a means for any
legal scholarship that is collected by those databases to turn up in the same
search that also turns up articles from the Harvard Law Review and other
elite journals.
In short, as Dan Hunter has observed, the Internet has drastically
"reshap[ed] the way that users can access content,"" in a way that weakens
the old gatekeepers' hold on power. Beyond that, the Internet has also
provided a variety of new formats in which legal scholars can present and
publicize their ideas. What this means, in effect, is that the old gatekeepers
can no longer keep the hordes from the gate. A vulgar arriviste who is
willing to use these new media can receive attention, readers, and even
respect without being certified in the traditional way by the traditional
sources. 19 That, at least, is the fairly conventional account offered by the
champions of the online age.20 This account is surely overstated, in part
for reasons I will suggest below. But it is certainly the chorus in the
21triumphalist song sung by a number of law bloggers in recent years. In
Getman's terms, it is the triumph of egalitarianism over elitism.
1 See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 2, at 2.
1 See Solum, supra note 9, at 854-56 (listing other examples of ways in which online speech may
encourage changes in the format of legal scholarship).
IS Dan Hunter, Open Access to Infinite Content (Or "In Praise ofLaw Reviews"), 10 LEWIS &
CLARKL. REv. 761, 768 (2006).
' Some of those online media may perform a light certification function, as Peg Brinig has
pointed out to me. For example, SSRN technically "peer reviews" papers that one uploads to the
service. Moreover, one must be selected for inclusion in the various subiect-matter series of papers
posted on SSRN, and selection involves choices made by the editors of these series, who are
themselves usually respected figures in the field. But the threshold for inclusion in both cases is low.
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 9, at 858 ("[T]here is no pretence of selecting only the 'best' pieces [on
SSRN]. Everything written by serious academics will be abstracted in the appropriate journal").
Although he is too modest to mention it, Larry Solum also performs a certification function when he
selects papers to publicize on his Legal Theory Blog.
20 See, e.g., Franklin G. Snyder, Late Night Thoughts on Blogging While Reading Duncan
Kennedy's Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy in an Arkansas Motel Room, 11
NEXUS 111, 121 (2006) (arguing that "[t]he ability of the institutions, particularly the elite ones, to
control the dialogue of legal education has decreased dramatically" as a result of blogs, SSRN, and
other online resources).
2 See Brian Leiter, Why Blogs Are Bad for Legal Scholarship, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 53,
57 (2006), http:/www.thepocketwart.org/2006/09/20/leiter.htmI (noting the note of "self-
congratulation" struck by many "like-minded academic bloggers," and their resistance "to the
suggestion that blogs are not as important as their proprietors think they are").
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These developments have triggered an ongoing debate about the
meaning and value of the changes in the environment of legal scholarship
caused by the online age. What does the online age add to the existing
order of legal scholarship? Does it take away from the existing order-and
are those changes good or bad? How do we address concerns about quality
in legal scholarship and/or blogging by legal scholars in the online age?
Are there reasons to be concerned about these developments as well as
welcoming them? And how should we measure the impact of these
developments on legal scholarship? A variety of increasingly familiar
arguments have been staked out on these positions. Underneath them all,
though, we can sense the recurring theme that is at least old as Getman's
book, and really far older: the contest between egalitarianism and elitism.
A nice example of this can be found in the second set of opposing
views on which I want to focus: a pair of observations by Larry Solum and
Brian Leiter, both of whom are renowned as legal scholars and as legal
bloggers. Solum argues that the Internet has disrupted the rule of the
traditional intermediaries in legal scholarship, and that this is, by and large,
a good thing, given the contributions that might be made to legal
scholarship by a wide range of individuals outside the gates of the
traditional elite law schools and law reviews:
I have been astonished by the thoughtful and genuinely
informative comments and blog posts that have come from
nonacademic sources. I'm proud to be an academic and I
believe in the value of academic institutions. But I think it is
both wrong and silly to think that credentials matter more
than content.22
Elsewhere, Solum has similarly argued that the online age has "opened
new doors for the intelligent and ambitious," and that "there is
extraordinary talent located outside the elite legal academy .... The smart
and motivated are everywhere."23
By contrast, Leiter has written to suggest that the online age eliminates
the "mediating boundaries" of "experience, education, and intelligence,"
and that this "poses problems for serious scholarship." 2 4 Responding to the
passage by Solum quoted above, Leiter acknowledges that there are "many
non-academic experts," and says, "one must, of course, agree that 'content'
matters more than 'credentials."' 2 5 But he worries that the reduced role of
elite intermediaries and the immediacy of the Internet will "conspire to
22 Blogging, Legal Scholarship, and Academic Careers, Legal Theory Blog,
http://lsolum.blo-spot.comaichives/2006 01 01 Isolum aichive.html#113683990156732487 (Jan. 9,
2006, 17:35 EST).
23 Solum, supra note 9, at 865.
24 Leiter, supra note 21, at 53.
2 Id. at 56.
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create availability cascades that result in inferior work getting the most
scholarly attention and, in the process, lowering the general quality of
scholarly discourse.",26 Blogs are "hostage to the ignorance and
irrationality of their most visible proprietors," and on the whole "have been
bad for legal scholarship, leading to increased visibility for mediocre
scholars and half-baked ideas and to a dumbing down of standards of
judgments."27
What is this dialogue, if not Getman's eternal conflict rewritten for a
new age? Solum strikes a distinctly egalitarian note, praising the online
age both for its ability to open up access to legal writing for a wide
audience beyond the conventional elite circles of legal scholarship and for
its ability to allow anyone and everyone to "contribute significant new
ideas to scholarly debates." 28 Leiter, in turn, strikes a note of elitism, with
his concern that the elimination of intermediaries will open the floodgates
to "mediocre scholars" and their "half-baked ideas." 29 His solution, too,
strikes a note of elitism: he suggests that the online age might be
counteracted by the increasing presence of "first-rate scholars" in the
blogosphere, and a "shift to peer-refereed publications in the legal
academy."3 o In other words, restore the gatekeepers.
Now, as I will suggest below, there is something to both positions.
Despite the usual tendency to freight these words with moral judgment,
and the easy appeal of standing with the masses and against the old guard,
egalitarianism is not always good, and elitism is not always bad-at least,
it is not necessarily bad if the selection of those elites is based on
something more than crude credentialism. But if I had to choose which
position to favor-or, more precisely, which mood to adopt, for both
Solum and Leiter evoke, in broad strokes, a general mood of optimism and
pessimism, respectively, about the online age-I would adopt Solum's
optimistic and egalitarian view.
In important respects, my vote for this position is influenced by my
take on changes in the larger legal profession, of which the advent of the
online age is, in some ways, an echo. Consider the entry of Jews into the
legal profession in the "old days" I discussed earlier. Not so long ago-
and, not coincidentally, at the height of "the American legal profession's
cartel" status3 -Jews were still unwelcome at many of the law firms that
sat perched at the top of the gatekeeping elite of the legal profession.32
26 d.
27 d.
8 Solum, supra note 9, at 865.
29 Leiter, supra note 21, at 57.
30'Jd.
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 60 (1995).
32 As Posner notes, the sentiment was an old one, and tended to express itself in elitist,
credentialist terms at one abstract remove from any actual mention of ethnicity. Thus, without
attributing any anti-Semitism to him, he quotes Professor Wigmore recommending early in the last
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But, in concert with and as a part of a broader suite of changes in the legal
profession that rendered it more competitive and less guild-like, Jews, and
members of other ethnic minorities, nevertheless stormed the gates of the
profession, and altered it forever. In Balkin's terms, they routed around
the old gatekeepers, transforming the profession in the process in ways that
the gatekeepers at the elite firms-many of which are now long gone-
could neither prevent nor fully foresee.
It is easy enough to "pine for the days of the professional guild and
professional mystique," before the vulgarization of the profession became
"an offense to the fastidious." Not a few lawyers have expressed
nostalgia for the old days, at least as they choose to remember them. But
there can be little doubt that opening the legal profession to genuine
competition was a good thing. It made the profession far more egalitarian,
and the very success of the new and "vulgar" entrants to the profession laid
bare the extent to which the old gatekeepers were elite by status, not merit,
and the degree to which the profession was and always had been a
business-albeit a cartel rather than a genuinely competitive one.34
One could make many of the same observations about the online age
of legal scholarship and its effects on the academic side of the legal
profession.3 As Solum observes, there is a significant crop of
extraordinarily talented legal scholars out there, and by no means are all of
them to be found in the mythical "top 15" law schools, or the top 50. His
own blog documents each year the increasingly impressive backgrounds of
entering professors at all strata of legal education. And yet, no matter how
accomplished or promising they are, they know that some set of
gatekeepers will judge them on little more than the school displayed on
their nametag at the next AALS convention. The online age offers these
"smart and motivated" 37 scholars a variety of methods for routing around
century that law students be required to have completed two years of college as "a beneficent measure
for reducing hereafter the spawning mass of promiscuous semi-intelligence which now enters the bar."
Id. at 61 n.38 (quoting John H. Wigmore, Should the Standard of Admission to the Bar Be Based on
Tio Years or More of College-Grade Education? It Should, 4 AM. L. SCH. REv. 30, 31 (1915)).
3 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 194, 196 (1999).
For examples of such laments, see, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How
THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
" See POSNER, supra note 33, at 196-97.
1 To be clear, I am not suggesting that any of the scholars who inhabit the "elitism" side of the
elitism-egalitarianism divide I am describing in legal scholarship harbor any improper or exclusionary
motives. I am only suggesting that certain aspects of the recurring conflict between elitism and
egalitarianism are evident in both the decartelization of the legal profession and the current discussion
of the online age of legal scholarship.
16 Everyone in legal education is familiar with this phenomenon, in which, on meeting someone at
the AALS convention, one watches his or her eyes slide toward the school name on one's nametag-
and, as often as not, to some entirely different part of the room immediately thereafter. We are all
aware of it because, often enough, our own eyes are completing a similar circuit. See generally Eric L.
Muller, What's in a Name(Tag)?, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 314 (2002).
7 Solum, supra note 9, at 865.
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the more status-obsessed members of the palace guard: distributing their
work on SSRN, hawking their ideas on blogs, taking advantage of online
law review supplements to enjoy at least a residue of the prestige
associated with their parent reviews ("My last piece was published in the
Harvard Law Review ... Forum"), and so on. Many of the charges that
were leveled against the new entrants to the legal profession in 1960 could
be raised against them today. They want to be heard, they want their ideas
to circulate, and they do not pretend otherwise. They cannot affect a
studied indifference to such matters as self-promotion, as could a junior
faculty member at an elite school, who knows that his or her institutional
affiliations alone will guarantee an audience and ample writing and
speaking invitations. Their model may seem to be Sammy Glick as much
as Erwin Griswold.
These up-and-comers of the online age are more vulgar than the more
elite members of the legal academy, by many measures-although the
elites are certainly just as ambitious. But iftheir work is good, and if they
succeed in finding an audience for it, I cannot help but think that is a good
thing. If their manner of doing so seems vulgar to some, then I cast my
vote with the vulgarians. If they are an "offense to the fastidious," then so
much the worse for the fastidious.
Now, some caveats must be added to this conclusion. First, as I've
said, egalitarianism is not always a good thing, and elitism is not always a
bad thing. Were it otherwise, Getman's work would not be nearly so
compelling, for he recognizes that both elitism and egalitarianism are
important motivating factors in the academy, that both have their role to
play, and that it is the good scholar's lot to remain suspended between
them, pulled in both directions. One may properly criticize the elite
gatekeepers when their position is founded on little more than status and
their role consists of little more than evaluating credentials and guarding
against challenges to that status. But that is not the same thing as denying
that there are authorities who have earned their authority, that there is and
can be such a thing as standards (hopefully, but not always, performance-
based ones), or that there is such a thing as good and bad scholarship. To
the extent that some gatekeepers-professors who are expert in a field,
refereed journals, or (even) law review editors-accurately certify some
work as more trustworthy and meritorious than other work, or negatively
stamp a particular work as poor, that function can be a valuable one,
helping to economize our limited time and attention by steering us toward
the best work and away from the worst.
Thus, I think there is something to be said for the "elitist" views
expressed by Professor Leiter. And Leiter is clear that "'content' matters
8 See BUDD SCHULBERG, WHAT MAKES SAMMY RUN? (1941).
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more than 'credentials,"' 3 9 although I am not sure whether he uses quotes
here because he is adopting Solum's terms, or because he wants to cast
doubt on them. And yet, I am troubled by his pessimistic view of the
online age, and of the value of blogs and bloggers in particular.
I do not mean to unduly extol bloggers. Nor do I mean to unearth a
subtext to Leiter's words if there is none there. But I find it hard to read
his comments without sensing a subterranean mood of credentialism. It
emerges, for instance, from the elision between drawing a distinction
between good and bad scholarship (or, as he puts it, "half-baked tripe"), 4 0
and his repeated focus on, and faith in, undefined "leading scholars,"4 1 or
"first-rate scholars" with "pre-Internet gravitas,"4 2 as opposed to the ranks
of "second-rate scholar[s]."43  I do not mean to deny that there is a
difference. But it is all too easy to move from a qualitative assumption
about the work of various scholars, which is difficult and time-consuming,
to a convenient but simplistic scrutiny of the names and places on their
resumes.
My sense that a crude, rather than sensitive and qualitative, elitism
might linger somewhere beneath the surface is reinforced by my doubts
about the primary concern Leiter raises-that blogging is especially
subject to "availability cascades,44 in which Internet buzz about
scholarship will elevate mediocre work over better and more careful work.
My sense is that this concern, although not unfounded, is overstated.
In thinking about this concern, we must consider the relevant
audiences for legal scholarship, whether traditional scholarship or its
Internet-driven variants. One audience is that of journalists, non-academic
lawyers, laypeople, and so on. I doubt their interest will affect legal
scholarship one way or the other; and while it may well be true that their
attention will focus at times on second-rate scholarship that makes its way
online, it will also sometimes fasten on first-rate ideas. In any event, how
are we better off if these individuals are simply deprived of access to
information altogether? Are their only options either to voice prejudices
uninformed by any information, of greater or lesser quality, or to wait
patiently for the elites to inform them what to think? A second audience
consists of second-rate scholars; but I should think that Leiter is not
interested in what they think in any event.
The third audience consists of "leading" or "first-rate" scholars. All
the online age has done is give them increasing access to scholarship from
a variety of sources and individuals. If they are capable of sorting between
" Leiter, supra note 21, at 56.
41 See id. at 55.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 57.
43 Id. at 53.
44 Id. at 54.
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good and bad scholarship, then so much the better-they will have more
access to both, easier access to first-rate scholarship from unknown
scholars and schools, and a cheaper and louder megaphone with which to
call attention to the good work. If they are not capable of distinguishing
between the two, then we ought to be suspicious of their own elite status.
So, in the end, while I think he does offer a useful reminder of the values
of elitism, I am not certain that Leiter's pessimism is strongly warranted. I
think Leiter raises some valid concerns, but worry that they may slide
easily into a simple concern with maintaining the status of what Solum
calls the "right people."45
I am thus left with the view that routing around the gatekeepers, a
phenomenon that is greatly facilitated by the online age, is on balance
more likely to be a good thing than a bad one. If it appears to be a more
vulgar pursuit than we are used to, that perception merely reflects the
extent to which the existing gatekeepers, like the white-shoe law firms of
old, have managed to launder or conceal the same ambitions and impulses
while maintaining guild-like privileges against those outside the gates.
But things are more complicated than that. For, as Balkin observes,
routing around is not the only observable phenomenon of the online age. It
also commonly features "glomming on"-the tendency of online media to
"depend on [traditional gatekeepers] rather than displace them. The old
gatekeepers don't go away entirely, and new ones arise that partially
supplement and partially compete with them."46 Thus, the online age is
likely both to reproduce old methods of signaling quality-one will care
more about the online presence of the Harvard Law Review than the online
Podunk Law Review-and to come up with new ones, such as ranking by
SSRN downloads (which will, in turn, generally favor papers uploaded by
scholars who have already been certified by the old gatekeepers).
Similarly, the old gatekeepers will find ways of glomming onto and
co-opting the new media. The Harvard Law Review will bring its status-
reinforcing type font to the online Harvard Law Review Forum, and
Harvard Law professors will upload their papers to SSRN, and take their
high download rates as further evidence that the elite certification process
is working as it should - or take their low downloads as evidence that the
new system is arbitrary and bankrupt. So the new methods of evaluating
one's work and one's influence in the online age will "gradually be layered
on top of existing methods of assessing quality and generating scholarly
reputations; and they will, over time, merge with and influence them."47
Thus, the online age will disturb and in some cases alter the ancien regime,
but as with most revolutions, a certain quality of "meet the new boss" will
45 Solum, supra note 9, at 865.
46 Balkin, supra note 14, at 28.
4 Id. at 29.
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sneak in.48  Certainly things will change in terms of the format of legal
scholarship49 and its availability,o and some new scholars may succeed in
routing around the old gatekeepers, thus achieving something like
Getman's dream of egalitarianism. But we will continue to have
gatekeepers in one form or another, certainly including the old
gatekeepers; after all, whatever their flaws, they do serve at their best to
separate the wheat from the chaff, as Leiter observes. So there will be
room for elitism in the online age too. The tension continues, as it must, in
this age as any other.
And this is where a measure of candor is called for. Like many young
scholars who have established a presence on the Internet, I am a champion
of the new regime. I welcome the egalitarian impulse of the online age, I
use it to advance my own ideas and seek new and wider platforms for my
work, and I cheer on those who route around the staid old traditional elites.
But I am also eager to receive status in the old regime. And I'm not only
talking about myself. Many legal bloggers, while stressing the
contributions that the online age makes to the egalitarian side of the eternal
scholarly divide, have also used it to "trade up"-to seek the approbation
and certification of elite law schools and elite law reviews. Perhaps we
deserve that approbation, and maybe we would have gotten it even if we
had stayed offline. But it is clear that we are self-consciously working the
new system to gain the prerogatives of the old. We are proving that
nametags don't matter, or shouldn't-while working the online age for the
chance at a better nametag.
There is a link here, I think, although perhaps not an entirely evident
one, to a phenomenon that I believe is related to the rise of the ostensibly
egalitarian online age: a dramatic increase in the interest we pay to
rankings in the legal academy." Our rankings fixation takes the form of
critiques of U.S. News, defenses of U.S. News, alternatives to it, citation
studies, law review rankings and critiques of those rankings, SSRN
rankings and critiques of those rankings, and so on.
I do not mean to demean these studies.52 Given the last paragraph, I
could hardly get away with doing so if I wanted to. Leaving aside the
48 THE WHO, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO'S NEXT (Polydor 1971).
49 See generally Solum, supra note 9.
5o See generally Hunter, supra note 18.
5 For a superb example, see Symposium, Dead Poets and Academic Progenitors: The Next
Generation of Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 1 (2006). In a recent paper, Pierre Schlag refers to
law schools' "obsessive fixation on rankings-rankings of law schools, rankings of law reviews,
rankings of legal scholars, rankings of citation and impact, and soon to come, by way of the web and
pomo, rankings of rankings." Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of
Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art) 32 (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-11, Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976078.
52 Indeed, this very collection of papers contains some valuable thoughts on the subject of law
reviews and law school rankings from one of my esteemed colleagues. See Alfred L. Brophy, Mrs.
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question of whether and why we would want to reform the rankings,
thinking about impact, citations, and so on is a perfectly valid and
important aspect of our study, not so much of law, but of the legal academy
as an institution. But it is worth asking why we are currently so intent on
the study of rankings, at the very moment at which the online age, by
providing an infinite content universe 5 and multiple opportunities for
routing around, has weakened the hold of the old gatekeepers: why, in
Pierre Schlag's formulation, we are suffering from such "rank anxiety." 54
Surely the reason has something to do with the fundamental insecurity
of the legal academy.55 Certaintly Brian Leiter is right to say that the legal
academy "often lacks expert mediators,"56 and we all know it. Such
insecurity is entirely natural in a field of scholarship that is so parasitic on
insights from other disciplines in which most law professors are not
thoroughly grounded, whose own internal methods often reduce to little
more than "case-law journalism,"5  and that either does not contain a
58canonical body of literature, or in any event certainly does not require its
resident scholars to master it through a doctoral process or any other
mechanism. 59  It is even more natural if, as Schlag argues, it is safer to
worry more about "how well or how badly we are doing [legal scholarship]
relative to everybody else" than about whether the entire enterprise of legal
scholarship is itself problematic.60
Finally, this fixation with rankings is still more natural if, as we might
frankly acknowledge, the legal academy tends to be populated by
individuals who are skilled, first and foremost, at jumping through hoops.
As Charles Lawrence wrote some time ago, "[1]aw school faculties recruit
and hire those candidates who have followed their own footsteps on a
prescribed path of high LSAT scores, superior grades at prestigious law
schools, editorships on prestigious law reviews, and prestigious judicial
Lincoln's Lawyer's Cat: The Future of Legal Scholarship, 39 CONN. L. REV. CONNTEMPLATIONS 11
(2007), http:/conntemplations.org/comments.php?v=07&m=05&entiv-entrv070505-120000.
5 See Hunter, supra note 18.
54 Schlag, supra note 51.
See generally id.
5 Leiter, supra note 21, at 54. 1 am not sure I agree with the somewhat narrow reasons why he
suggests this is so. In effect, Leiter blames this on law students and the media. They are excellent
targets, but I tend to assume that the fault lies in ourselves.
5 Schlag again. See Schlag, supra note 51, at 27.
5 Although efforts have been made to arrive at one, as well as to study canonicity in American
legal scholarship more generally. See LEGAL CANONS (Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000);
THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher eds., 2006).
5 David Lodge's academic comedy CHANGING PLACES contains a parlor game played by English
professors, called "Humiliation," in which the object of the game is to name a literary classic that one
has not read, with the winner being the person who displays the most embarrassing ignorance. One
academic wins the game, and loses his chances at professional advancement, when he admits he has not
read Hamlet. See DAVID LODGE, CHANGING PLACES: A TALE OF TWO CAMPUSES 135-36 (1975).
This is a game that law professors would be well advised not to play.
6o Schlag, supra note 51, at 34.
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clerkships."61 We are used to being evaluated and praised, and we have
never lost the taste for it. Hence the epigraph to this paper. The legal
academy is, truly, a collection of JD-carrying Lisa Simpsons. We are
never happier than when a gold star is being put on our papers: by our local
colleagues, by professors at elite institutions, and even (or especially) by
student law review editors at the "right" journals. 62 It is natural, then, that
we should turn our attention to building newer and more elaborate
evaluation systems for ourselves-especially in an online age that, as I
have suggested, disrupts the old evaluation systems.
Another useful way of thinking about both the online age and our
present rank anxiety-two highly related phenomena, as I hope I have
shown-comes from the notion of the "economy of prestige," which has
been used by James English to describe the culture of prize-giving.
English argues, in short, that the very act of criticizing prizes-for the
biases implicit in selecting them and for the very absurdity of awarding
them-"is itself a fundamental and even in many circumstances an
obligatory part of the game, a recognizable mode of complicitous
participation" in the cultural function of creating prestige as a form of
cultural capital.64
We might profitably view the struggle between the old and new
gatekeepers of the legal academy, and the endless concern with rankings,
in this light. By routing around the old gatekeepers, we are in effect
signaling our continued fascination with the status they can confer. By
glomming onto the online media and the egalitarianism they represent, the
old gatekeepers-perhaps including this law review-both co-opt the new
media and attempt to retain their traditional gatekeeping status. By
critiquing existing forms of ranking (and proposing new ones), we
similarly are validating ranking as an activity just as much as we are
attempting to undermine the existing forms of ranking. We might thus
develop on Balkin by saying that "routing around" and "glomming on" are
not two separate characteristics: they are, in fact, intimately related aspects
of the system of legal scholarship as a form of cultural capital. My
embarrassing revelation about my own relationship to the online age, and
Charles R. Lawrence, "Justice" or "Just Us": Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 831, 855 n.88 (1983).
62 In fairness, this concern with the markers of status is hardly limited to the legal academy,
although, for the reasons I have offered, it might be especially acute in that field. For a discussion of
the "widespread concern with status and the measurement of status in our society" and an attempt to
relate it to the legal academy's rankings fixation, see Michael E. Solimine, Status Seeking and the
Allure and Limits ofLaw, School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 299, 306-08 (2006).
63 See generally JAMES F. ENGLISH, THE ECONOMY OF PRESTIGE: PRIZES, AWARDS, AND THE
CIRCULATION OF CULTURAL VALUE (2005). Michael Madison has already argued for the relevance of
English's work to the world of law reviews, and the newer world of online legal scholarship. See
Michael J. Madison, The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige, and Open Access, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 901, 905-07 (2006).
6 ENGLISH, supra note 63, at 189.
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that of many of my online colleagues-that we are both critics of existing
forms of prestige and eager supplicants for them-is thus perhaps not as
embarrassing as I had feared. The online and offline players are each
engaged in the same cultural capital game, and it is the only game in town.
65Given this fix, I end with very little by way of prescription. I remain
an optimist about the contribution that the online age of legal scholarship
can make to legal scholarship as a whole, and equally optimistic about the
value of the online age in breaking down old hierarchies and offering
young scholars new means of circulating their ideas outside the usual
restrictive fora. But I also must acknowledge that the online age is not so
separate from the old gatekeepers as it may want to seem, and that this will
be increasingly true as the old gatekeepers find new ways of participating
in the online age, or turn SSRN and other creatures of the online age into
,,66new means of "processing professional prestige". Whether online or off,
the legal academy is too insecure, and too concerned with the making and
trading of prestige as a cultural good, to stop just because it has found new
and better means of distributing the underlying work itself. Prizes there
must be. The online age may substantially democratize the process,
although even that is uncertain, but it certainly will not eliminate it. To the
contrary, it is an increasingly important part of the game. One might hope
that we could simply stop playing the game altogether; that we could care
only about the underlying work, not where it appears or who has certified it
as great, and that we might devote somewhat less time to measuring each
other, or to measuring those measures. I might also hope to be the world's
first 200-year-old man. But I am betting neither will happen.
Still, there may be some light at the end of the tunnel.67 In his study of
the culture of prestige, English writes that the nature and volume of public
criticism of prizes has reached such a point that we may finally witness
"the weakening of the collective magic by which aesthetics has for so long
been levitated, the gradual revelation of a hidden support system extending
upward from the ground of social practice to the higher level of art."68 To
quote Louis Menand, this "willingness to speak without embarrassment
about the significance of prizes and awards, and about the whole economy
of cultural production and consumption, may, paradoxically, signal the
demise of the prize system." 69 Perhaps a similar fate awaits the legal
academy. Maybe if we can "speak without embarrassment" about the role
of both the old gatekeepers and the new online age in the production of
65 Cf Schlag, supra note 51, at 29 ("[W]hen was the last time you saw a law review article end on
the note, 'Oh, my god, we are all so totally fucked'?!").
66 Madison, supra note 63, at 913.
6 Thus proving Schlag's point yet again. See supra note 65.
6 ENGLISH, supra note 63, at 245.
69 Louis Menand, All That Glitters: Literature's Global Economy, NEW YORKER, Dec. 26, 2005,
at 136, available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWYRK File.
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prestige, and acknowledge the role of rankings-"good" ones and "bad"
ones-in generating the same cultural capital, the whole game will lose
some of its luster. Until then, as Getman observed, we will remain caught
exquisitely between egalitarianism and elitism, openly championing one
and privately craving the other.
